What Financial Resources Does the Council of Europe Have or Need?
Stefanie Schmahl, Professor of Law, Julius Maximilians Universität of Würzburg, Germany
I. Introduction
For almost 75 years, the Council of Europe has been the benchmark for human rights, the rule of law and democracy in Europe and an effective framework for cooperation for the benefit of member states. The member states reiterate their pledge to uphold these values at regular intervals, most recently and prominently at the 4th Summit of Heads of State and Government, held in Reykjavík in May 2023.[1] There, they also reaffirmed their strong and enduring commitment to the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and the European Court of Human Rights, created under the auspices of the Council of Europe.
The Council of Europe cannot fulfil its functions without having the necessary financial apparatus. Questions of budget and financing may come across as being of a purely technical nature, but in reality, they are a key issue shaping not only the distribution of powers and political influence of member states but also the organisation’s institutional independence and proper functioning.[2]
This article therefore examines the Council of Europe’s expenditure and revenues, starting with the Programme and Budget of the Council of Europe for 2022-2025, to see whether and to what extent this gives the organisation sufficient scope to carry out its tasks. The Reykjavík Summit and subsequent efforts to improve the organisation’s financial resources are also central considerations. A brief assessment of the new Programme and Budget 2024-2027 concludes the article.
II. Programme and Budget of the Council of Europe for 2022-2025
The Programme and Budget of the Council of Europe for 2022-2025 is the first to cover a four-year period. Since 2011, the organisation had operated with a biennial General Programme and Budget.[3] The switch to a four-year programme is intended to place greater emphasis on an interim review to ultimately increase the impact of the Council of Europe’s programmes.
In methodological terms, the Council of Europe typically works with a budget forecast at the beginning of the four-year period. If necessary, the budget is adjusted annually, which was the case, for instance, with the 2023 annual budget of interest in this article. The actual budget usually drawn up at the end of each financial year does not yet seem to be publicly available for 2023 and cannot therefore be used as the basis for the following considerations.[4]
1. Expenditure
As regards (forecasted) expenditure, the Ordinary Budget of the Council of Europe for 2023 amounted to approximately €264 million, i.e. about 55% of the General Budget, which totalled €479 million.[5]
The General Budget consists of other budgets, arising mainly from (enlarged) partial agreements[6] and other forms of international cooperation,[7] as well as extraordinary budgets such as European Union contributions to “joint programmes”[8] and secured voluntary contributions from member states.[9]
The operational pillar of the Ordinary Budget 2023 was structured around three thematic sub-pillars which correspond to the organisation’s fundamental values: human rights, rule of law and democracy.[10] Within the Ordinary Budget, the human rights pillar was the most expensive at almost €121 million in total, while the rule of law pillar only had €16 million allocated and the democracy pillar €43 million. The remainder of the Ordinary Budget, nearly €84 million, was mainly earmarked for administration, governing bodies and general services.[11]
a) Human Rights Pillar
It is easy to explain why the expenditure for the human rights pillar within the Ordinary Budget 2023 is comparatively high. Besides diverse human rights programmes such as those ensuring effective protection of women and children’s rights, the pillar comprises the European Court of Human Rights as well as supervision of the effective implementation of the Court’s judgments at national levels.[12]
For years, the European Court of Human Rights has had to absorb large numbers of new cases. Amid current international tensions and in light of prevailing economic and political crises, the Court’s role in protecting human rights is more relevant than ever.[13] It is therefore understandable that the Court is allocated nearly €77 million of the expenditure of the human rights pillar. However, this is not a large amount if the budget of the European Court of Human Rights is compared with that of the German Federal Constitutional Court. The latter had €36.3 million at its disposal in 2022 and €40.5 million in 2023,[14] which corresponds to approximately half the resources available to the European Court of Human Rights in 2023.
The effective implementation of the judgments of the European Court of Human Rights at national levels also received a relatively considerable amount of €20 million in 2023. Article 46 of the ECHR confers on the Committee of Ministers the responsibility for supervising the execution of the Court’s final rulings in the member states. In fact, the long-term effectiveness of the Convention system relies on the full and timely execution of the judgments of the European Court of Human Rights by the states parties. However, the implementation of many Court judgments is still fraught with serious challenges, not least as regards unresolved armed conflicts and systemic problems in some member states.[15] To successfully tackle these challenges, member states’ capacity to execute the Court’s judgments promptly, fully and effectively must be strengthened.
The human rights pillar is further supported by other budgets and extraordinary resources, but only to a minor extent. For instance, almost €9 million are co-financed by the European Union, and approximately €6.5 million come from voluntary contributions on the part of specific member states.
b) Rule of Law Pillar
The main objective of the rule of law pillar is to develop a pan-European legal area in which robust, transparent and accessible democratic institutions and procedures, based on the rule of law, exist at all levels. The rule of law and the separation of powers are crucial for the integrity and proper functioning of public institutions and for ensuring the effective enjoyment of human rights and the safety of citizens.[16] The Council of Europe has therefore been carrying out activities under the rule of law pillar for many years through standard-setting and relevant monitoring bodies, such as the Group of States against Corruption (GRECO), the Committee of Experts on the Evaluation of Anti-Money Laundering Measures and the Financing of Terrorism (MONEYVAL) and the Group of Experts on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings (GRETA), most of which have proven to be extremely useful in legal practice. The European Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice Commission) and the relevant intergovernmental structures also provide important guidance in these fields, including for the development of targeted assistance for states.
In addition, the Council of Europe takes various measures against crime and for the safety and (health) protection of citizens within the framework of the rule of law pillar. These include the European Directorate for the Quality of Medicines and Healthcare (EDQM, pharmacopoeia) as well as the Pompidou Group, which is dedicated to combating drugs and addiction.
However, only €16 million were earmarked for the rule of law pillar in the Ordinary Budget of 2023 – which does not seem much. Yet, it should be noted that the rule of law pillar attracts a further €87 million from other budgets (mainly from EDQM with €78 million, but also, to a lesser extent, from GRECO and the Pompidou Group) and €24 million from extra-budgetary funds through cooperation activities, especially in the areas of enlarged partial agreements. The main financier is the European Union, but some member states also contribute voluntarily.[17]
c) Democracy Pillar
Furthermore, Europe is currently experiencing a democratic backslide. Many European countries are facing serious economic, social and health crises, which in turn provide fertile ground for racism, antisemitism, intolerance and violent extremism. There is also evidence of a growing disconnect between the public and political institutions as electoral turnout continues to fall, trust in public authorities declines, poverty and inequality increase, and the space for civil society to thrive shrinks.[18] To reverse this slide and address additional challenges generated by digital transformation, a concerted effort is required to safeguard and uphold democracy in all member states.[19]
Against this backdrop, the democracy pillar did not receive sufficient resources in 2023. It obtained around €43 million from the Ordinary Budget, €34 million from other budgets (such as Eurimages and the European Youth Foundation)[20] and around €8 million from extraordinary resources. In total, this pillar therefore only had about €86 million at its disposal.[21]
2. Revenues
This rather modest appropriation is directly related to the organisation’s income. The Council of Europe’s revenues have always consisted mainly of mandatory and voluntary contributions from member states. Extra-budgetary resources, especially from the European Union, also play a certain role. Other revenues such as donations from private individuals, retributions for services rendered and borrowing are so small that they can be disregarded here.
a) Legal Bases
The exact distribution of revenues is not stated in the Statute of the Council of Europe.[22] The Statute mentions only the basic principles in Articles 38 and 39. However, the financial provisions have since been clarified by various internal acts of the organisation.[23] In particular, with Resolution 94(31), adopted in November 1994, the Committee of Ministers resolved that the obligatory member states’ contributions, as from 1995 onwards, should be calculated using the average of the data on annual population and Gross Domestic Product of each member state. The weighting to be given to the data on gross domestic product shall be five times the weighting given to the data on population.[24]
In addition, there are some special features regarding revenues, which are subject to considerable fluctuations given the changing circumstances within Europe:
b) A Declining Number of “Big Contributors”
Until the end of 2015, nearly 55% of the Council of Europe’s expenditure was voluntarily borne by five larger member states, namely France, Germany, Italy, the United Kingdom and Russia. They all paid the same rate, around €24 million, towards the Ordinary Budget in 2015.[25] The difference between them and the “regular” contributors does not formally give them any greater political weight. It does increase their authority and “soft power”, however.
Presumably for this reason, in January 2016, Türkiye voluntarily become a major contributor to the Council of Europe’s Ordinary Budget – with the same financial rate as the previous “big five”.[26] But Türkiye’s status only lasted one year. After the coup attempt in 2016 and subsequent interventions by the Council of Europe in Türkiye, the Turkish government decided to give up its status as a major financier at the end of the year. Since then, Türkiye has gone back to being just a regular contributor. The difference this makes in the Council of Europe’s Ordinary Budget for 2023 is to the tune of €20 million.[27]
On 16 March 2022, the Russian Federation was expelled from the organisation because of its attack on Ukraine, which is a blatant violation of international law and the values of the Council of Europe.[28] In the event of an expulsion, the Committee of Ministers is obliged, in accordance with Article 8 of the Statute, to examine the financial consequences of the expulsion and to make appropriate arrangements for the relevant years. Overall, Russia’s exclusion created an even bigger hole in the Council of Europe’s budget than Türkiye’s decision to no longer remain a major contributor after just a year.
As a result, in May 2022, the Committee of Ministers agreed to close the gap in the 2022 and 2023 contributions resulting from the exclusion of the Russian Federation. In this context, the minimum contribution rate set in Resolution (94)31 was increased – albeit by a paltry 0.0008% – from 0.1200% to 0.1208% to ensure the collective nature of the effort to guarantee the organisation’s financial sustainability.[29] At the same time, the total expenses in the Ordinary Budget for 2022 and 2023 were reduced. According to the renewed Programme and Budget document, the Council of Europe was mainly financed by the four largest contributors in 2023. France, Germany, Italy and the United Kingdom paid nearly €33.46 million each to the Ordinary Budget and around €668,000 each to the Extraordinary Budget in the form of voluntary contributions. For the sake of comparison, Türkiye only paid about a third of that, i.e. €12.79 million for the Ordinary Budget and roughly €255,000 for the Extraordinary Budget. And San Marino invested the lowest rate of all member states, at around €92,000 for the Ordinary Budget and €1,852 for the Extraordinary Budget.[30]
Of course, states with observer status in the Council of Europe or which take part in the enlarged partial agreements are also obliged to pay contributions to the organisation. The highest amounts from the 19 non-members of the Council of Europe go to the Venice Commission. The largest contributor to the budgets of the enlarged partial agreements is the US, with around €530,000; it is a member of the Venice Commission and GRECO. The smallest contributor is Kyrgyzstan with €1,968; it only takes part in the Venice Commission.[31]
II. Proposals at the Reykjavik Summit
In connection with the Reykjavík Summit, the Committee of Ministers decided in 2023 to undertake a detailed and full review of the Programme and Budget as part of its reflections on the long-term strategic role of the organisation for 2024 and beyond. This was aimed at ensuring a strong and focused Council of Europe that can adapt to the fundamentally changed geopolitical landscape.[32] In this context, it was decided that a new four-year Programme would be drawn up for the period 2024-2027, building on the outcome of the Summit.
In Reykjavík, the Heads of State and Government also announced the establishment of an enlarged partial agreement on the Register of Damage Caused by the Aggression of the Russian Federation against Ukraine, intended to constitute the first component of a future international comprehensive compensation mechanism.[33] This decision is to be welcomed. However, from a budgetary perspective, it is clear that this Register does not cover the costs of the numerous individual and State complaints against Russia that are still pending. Such complaints can be submitted to the European Court of Human Rights if they concern circumstances that occurred up to 16 September 2022, the date of Russia’s exclusion from the European Convention on Human Rights.[34] Individual complaints against Russia are expected to decrease significantly in the next few years though, especially since the Russian government no longer implements the Court’s rulings anyway.
III. Challenges and Future Prospects
All this shows that, despite some efforts made in 2023, the Council of Europe is not in a good financial position. It is therefore important to consider what solutions could be available so that the organisation can continue to carry out its important tasks in the future.
1. Increase in Voluntary Contributions from Member States?
One possibility is to increase member states’ voluntary contributions. As a rule, member states that have a particular interest in the running or expansion of a Council of Europe thematic programme are also willing to pay regular voluntary contributions to be used for these programmes. This form of income is essential for the implementation and follow-up of certain programmes. However, it raises problems regarding the organisation’s autonomous decision-making. There is a risk that voluntary contributions will be used as tools to influence the organisation’s overall policy.[35] In addition, voluntary contributions intended to finance specific activities may, in the long run, result in the factual dissolution of the organisation into separate sub-programmes where particular interests of specific groups predominate. As such, the Council of Europe, which aims at establishing Europe-wide standards in the fields of human rights, the rule of law and democracy, should accept such disuniting tendencies only up to a certain point.[36]
2. Increase in Extrabudgetary Contributions by the European Union?
Another possibility would be for the European Union (EU) to increase its financial aid within the extra-budgetary resources of the Council of Europe. Since 1993, in pursuit of common goals and values, the Council of Europe and the EU have developed a special cooperation instrument, called “joint programmes”, to enhance the Council’s impact and operational capacity. While the Council of Europe is responsible for the implementation of the joint programmes, the European Commission and the Committee of Ministers provide joint funding for the programmes. In some cases, funding is shared on an equal basis, but mostly the EU contributes with proportionally more financial resources.[37] A corresponding increase in EU funding could help the Council of Europe to resolve its financial difficulties. However, this makes the Council of Europe dependent on the politics and policies of the European Union,[38] which is detrimental to its independence and its substantive programmes.
3. Establishment of a Separate Budget for the European Court of Human Rights?
In line with Article 50 of the ECHR, which stipulates that the expenditure on the European Court of Human Rights shall be borne by the Council of Europe, the human rights pillar also includes the operating expenses for the European Court of Human Rights. Said expenses primarily cover staffing at the Court, the costs of Chambers and the Registry.[39] Consequently, the Court does not have a separate budget but is financially dependent on the Council of Europe’s General Budget and thus on the Committee of Ministers’ approval.
The fact that the budget of a judicial body, which is supposed to act with autonomous authority, is wholly dependent on the financial decision-making of an executive organ has been rightly criticised in the past.[40] Judicial independence should indeed go hand-in-hand with a certain budgetary independence. It would therefore be desirable for the European Court of Human Rights to have the right to decide on its own budget, at least to some extent. The Parliamentary Assembly has long demanded that the Court’s budget be separated from the overall budget of the Council of Europe and that the amount allocated to the Court be significantly increased.[41] At the very least, it should be ensured that member states’ compulsory contributions are set in such a way as to cover the administrative costs of their respective judges at the Court. This possibility would be a third conceivable way to make the Council of Europe’s budget in the area of human rights at least partially more crisis-proof and to ensure that the European Court of Human Rights can continue to fulfil its pivotal function of maintaining individual freedom and protecting human rights.
4. Increase in Mandatory Contributions from Member States?
Even if it was not pursued for many years for purely political reasons,[42] a fourth solution has of course long been obvious: increasing the obligatory contributions of the Council of Europe member states. That step was finally taken in December 2023 with the Programme and Budget 2024-2027.[43] According to this Programme, the global budget of the Council of Europe will be raised to €624.6 million and the Ordinary Budget to €299.3 million.[44] Compared to the 2023 Programme and Budget, which encompassed €479 million for the General Budget and an amount of around €264 million for the Ordinary Budget, the increase is not insignificant.
In this context, expenditure has also been restructured. Instead of the previous three pillars (human rights pillar, rule of law pillar and democracy pillar), three new pillars are planned. The first column covers the expenses for the institutions, which include not only the Parliamentary Assembly, the Congress of Local and Regional Authorities, and the Commissioner of Human Rights, but also – and in a prominent place – the European Court of Human Rights. In total, the institutions will obtain €116 million, of which the Court will receive the relatively considerable amount of €84.9 million. The second pillar, now referred to as the “dynamic triangle”, mainly covers standard-setting, monitoring, execution of judgments, and cooperation. It will have access to €85.1 million. The support pillar, which includes, inter alia, the costs for the Committee of Ministers, the Secretary General, for general administration and common services, is to be endowed with €98.2 million.
To be able to meet these planned expenditures, the member states’ obligatory and voluntary contributions to the Council of Europe’s Ordinary Budget have also been significantly increased for 2024. The major contributors France, Germany, Italy and the United Kingdom will each contribute just over €37.18 million to the Council of Europe’s regular budget for 2024 (instead of €33.46 million in 2023). By way of comparison, Türkiye will pay around €14.28 million to the Ordinary Budget (instead of €12.79 million in 2023), and San Marino’s contributions will be increased from €92,000 in 2023 to €102,213 in 2024.[45]
IV- Conclusion
At the 4th Summit in Reykjavík in 2023, the Heads of State and Government re-emphasised the importance of the Council of Europe. They also pointed out that the current resources of the European Court of Human Rights are insufficient to adequately deal with the influx of new and pending applications. They promised to ensure the allocation of sufficient and sustainable resources to enable the Court to exercise its judicial functions effectively and to deal with its workload expeditiously.[46] They also pledged that the Council of Europe shall be more agile, resilient, and results-oriented.[47]
None of these statements should remain lip service. The President of the Conference of International Non-Governmental Organisations rightly stated at the Reykjavík Summit that it should not be too difficult to increase the obligatory contribution rates to the Council of Europe, as these are barely visible in the member states’ domestic budgets. On the contrary, this increase would represent tangible proof that member states are genuinely committed to the principles and values of the Council of Europe.[48] In short: if member states value the work of the Council of Europe – and they should do so in the interests of the freedom and well-being of the European population – they should also take financial responsibility for it. This is true despite current budget crises, in connection with which governments are trying to tighten their spending. There are so many other areas that can cope with reasonable cuts in government subsidies. For example, the administrative bureaucracy in various European states, which typically causes high personnel costs, could be reduced.
All in all, the new Draft Programme and Budget 2024-2027 is a step in the right direction. However, tempering this positive evaluation is the wider economic context. Indeed, the increase in contributions comes partly in response to general inflation, worldwide and in Europe.[49] Looking at the inflation-adjusted figures, the Council of Europe’s new financial resources are not as high as stated. Particularly considering the annual budget of the United Nations (more than $3 billion),[50] the Council of Europe’s budget appears small by comparison.
[1] Reykjavík Declaration, United around our values, Reykjavík Summit, 4th Summit of Heads of State and Government of the Council of Europe, 16-17 May 2023, p. 3.
[2] See Matthias Ruffert and Christian Walter, Institutionalised International Law, C.H. Beck/Hart/Nomos: München/Oxford/Baden-Baden 2015, § 10 MN 360-361; Thordis Ingadóttir, ‘Financing International Institutions’ in: Jan Klabbers and Åsa Wallendahl (eds.), Research Handbook on the Law of International Organisations, Edward Elgar: Cheltenham 2011, pp. 108-131, at 108.
[3] Revised Financial Regulations and Supplementary Provisions of the Council of Europe as adopted by the Committee of Ministers on 29 June 2011 and amended on 19-20 November 2013.
[4] Only the actual budget for 2022 is public at the moment, see Budgetary Management Accounts of the Council of Europe for the year ended 31 December 2022 and Report of the External Auditor, Ministers’ Deputies CM Documents, CM(2023)100-add, of 31 May 2023. The document has been classified restricted until examination by the Committee of Ministers on 14 September 2023.
[5] Council of Europe Programme and Budget 2022-2025 (2023 Adjusted), Ministers’ Deputies CM Documents, CM(2023)1, of 15 December 2022, pp. 1-2 (Table 1).
[6] Partial agreements are a special form of cooperation within the Council of Europe, in which only some member states take part. From a statutory point of view, a partial agreement is an activity of the organisation, except that it has its own budget and working methods, which are determined exclusively by the members of the agreement. Non-member states can also be invited to participate in partial agreements, which are then referred to as enlarged partial agreements. For more details, see Committee of Ministers’ Statutory Resolution (93)28, of 14 May 1993, on partial and enlarged agreements.
[7] The organisation’s international cooperation activities include country-specific action plans, particularly in states neighbouring the Council of Europe.
[8] The European Union implements “joint programmes” with the Council of Europe and provides financial resources pro rata temporis for the respective programmes.
[9] Secured voluntary contributions include those made by member states and non-member states on a separate contractual basis, see Council of Europe Programme and Budget 2022-2025 (2023 Adjusted), CM(2023)1, op. cit., p. 21.
[10] Ibid., p. 17.
[11] Ibid., pp. 1-2 (Table 1).
[12] For details, see ibid., pp. 23-70.
[13] Ibid., p. 26.
[14] See Statista, Ausgaben im deutschen Bundeshaushalt für das Bundesverfassungsgericht in den Jahren von 2012 bis 2022 und Planung bis 2024, August 2023.
[15] Council of Europe Programme and Budget 2022-2025 (2023 Adjusted), CM(2023)1, op. cit., p. 32.
[16] Ibid., p. 72.
[17] For details see ibid., pp. 72-108.
[18] Ibid., p. 110.
[19] Ibid., p. 110.
[20] Eurimages is the Council of Europe Fund for the co-production, distribution, and exhibition of international cinematographic works. The European Youth Foundation is the Council of Europe Fund to encourage cooperation among young people and their meaningful participation in democratic processes.
[21] Council of Europe Programme and Budget 2022-2025 (2023 Adjusted), CM(2023)1, op. cit., pp. 109-153.
[22] Statute of the Council of Europe, of 5 May 1949, ETS No. 1.
[23] For more details, see Stefanie Schmahl, ‘Budget and Financing’ in: Stefanie Schmahl and Marten Breuer (eds.), The Council of Europe. Its Law and Policies, Oxford University Press: Oxford 2017, § 5 MN 5.02.
[24] For more details, see Committee of Ministers’ Resolution (94)31 on the method of calculating the scale of member states’ contributions to the Council of Europe budgets, of 4 November 1994, Appendix I.
[25] Stefanie Schmahl, ‘Budget and Financing’, op. cit., § 5 MN 5.08.
[26] See Committee of Ministers’ Resolution (2015)28 on the adjustment of the scale of contributions to the Council of Europe Ordinary Budget and budget of the European Youth Foundation with effect from 1 January 2016, of 25 November 2015, and Committee of Ministers’ Decision (2015)81 on priorities for 2016-2017 and their budgetary implications, of 13 May 2015. Both decisions are reflected in the Council of Europe Programme and Budget 2016-2017, Ministers’ Deputies CM Documents, CM(2016)1, of 21 December 2015, pp. 7, 9, and 187 (Table 2).
[27] Council of Europe Programme and Budget 2022-2025 (2023 Adjusted), CM(2023)1, op. cit., p. 208 (Table 2).
[28] Committee of Ministers’ Resolution CM/Res(2022)2 on the cessation of the membership of the Russian Federation to the Council of Europe, of 16 March 2022.
[29] Council of Europe Programme and Budget 2022-2025 (2023 Adjusted), CM(2023)1, op. cit., p. 3.
[30] Ibid., p. 208 (Table 2).
[31] Ibid., p. 208 (Table 2).
[32] Ibid., p. 3.
[33] Reykjavík Declaration, op. cit., p. 4.
[34] Committee of Ministers’ Resolution on legal and financial consequences of the cessation of membership of the Russian Federation in the Council of Europe, CM/Res(2022)3, of 23 March 2022, para. 7.
[35] See Jan Klabbers, An Introduction to International Institutional Law, Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 2nd ed. 2009, p. 126.
[36] Stefanie Schmahl, ‘Budget and Financing’, op. cit., § 5 MN 5.14.
[37] Ibid., § 5 MN 5.19.
[38] This convincing argument has been put forward by Gabriela Quarg, ‘Die Zusammenarbeit des Europarats mit anderen internationalen Organisationen’ in: Uwe Holtz (ed.), 50 Jahre Europarat, Nomos: Baden-Baden 2000, pp. 257-270, at 264.
[39] See Yuval Shany, Assessing the Effectiveness of International Courts, Oxford University Press: Oxford 2014, p. 270.
[40] See, e.g., Elisabeth Lambert-Abdelgawad, ‘The Court as a Part of the Council of Europe’ in: Andreas Føllesdal, Birgit Peters and Geir Ulfstein (eds.), Constituting Europe, Cambridge University Press: Cambridge 2013, pp. 263-300, at 291-293, with further references.
[41] In particular, see Parliamentary Assembly Recommendation 1812 (2007) on the political dimension of the Council of Europe budget, of 3 October 2007, para. 7.4.
[42] The Council of Europe’s resources have not kept pace with its rapid growth in membership over the last three decades, see Jörg Polakiewicz, ‘Council of Europe’, Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law, online, Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2019, MN 15.
[43] The Council of Europe Programme and Budget 2024-2027 (Ministers’ Deputies CM Documents, CM(2024)1, of 19 December 2023), was preceded by the Draft Council of Europe Programme and Budget 2024-2027, Ministers’ Deputies CM Documents, CM(2023)130, of 31 August 2023. The data, numbers and statistics differ slightly.
[44] As regards the following data and statistics, see Council of Europe Programme and Budget 2024-2027, CM(2024)1, ibid., p. 2.
[45] Ibid., p. 193 (Table 2).
[46] Reykjavík Declaration, op. cit., p. 18-19.
[47] Ibid., p. 8.
[48] See Gerhard Ermischer, Text of the Intervention of the President of the Conference of INGOs, Summit of Heads of State and Government of the Council of Europe, Reykjavík 16-17 May 2023.
[49] Council of Europe Programme and Budget 2024-2027, CM(2024)1, op. cit., pp. 13-14.
[50] The 27 EU member states bear almost 24% of the contribution burden to the United Nations, see Stefanie Schmahl, ‘Die Internationalen und die Supranationalen Organisationen’ in: Alexander Proelß (ed.), Völkerrecht, De Gruyter: Berlin 9th ed. 2024, pp. 387-551, at 523.
