The reinforcement of the relations of the Council of Europe with civil society after the Reykjavik Summit

The Council of Europe (CoE) and civil society have a mutually reinforcing relationship. Proper implementation by states of CoE standards on fundamental freedoms allows civil society the space it needs to function. Contributions of civil society to the standard-setting, monitoring and cooperation activities of the CoE often add value and impact. The Reykjavik Declaration’s call for “further reinforcement of the Organisation’s (…) meaningful engagement with civil society organisations” should in particular lead to providing a stimulating environment for advocacy initiatives on the recognition and implementation of CoE standards. This requires more engagement with national civil society actors, currently undervalued in the CoE architecture. Proposals for work of the Organisation in this direction can be traced in documents issued over the last decade, but they need more consistent follow-up.

Harry HUMMEL, human rights expert and campaigner, member of the campaign team of CURE (Campaign to Uphold Rights in Europe)¹

1. Introduction

The outcome document of the May 2023 Summit, the Reykjavik Declaration, refers to civil society in a paragraph that calls for “a review and further reinforcement of the Organisation’s outreach to, and meaningful engagement with, civil society organisations and national human rights institutions.”² The Declaration also announces the stepping up and strengthening of the engagement of the CoE with “democratic actors in Europe” and of “efforts to create an enabling environment for human rights defenders”.³ On Belarus and Russia, the two European states that are outside the Council of Europe (CoE), the Declaration said that ways will be found to strengthen cooperation with human rights defenders, democratic forces, free media and independent civil society.⁴

Also, several of the Appendices to the Declaration recognize the importance of civil society in Council of Europe processes. The Reykjavík Principles for Democracy (Appendix III) , reaffirm in point 9 “that civil society is a prerequisite for a functioning democracy and commit to supporting and maintaining a safe and enabling environment in which civil society, as well as human rights defenders, can operate free from hindrance, insecurity and violence.”⁵ Appendix IV on the implementation of the European Convention on Human Rights recognizes the role of, inter alia, civil society organisations in monitoring compliance with the Convention and the Court’s judgments.⁶ In Appendix V, the Summit participants “recognize and support the vital role of civil society and other stakeholders (…) in the protection of the environment.”⁷

These pronouncements are part of a history of involvement of civil society in the Council of Europe which dates back to before the start of the organisation. After the Second World War, a range of initiatives started to stimulate cooperation among European nations to promote peace, cooperation and prosperity and to protect rights and freedoms. The 1948 Congress of Europe in The Hague was a meeting of around 800 representatives of different sectors of society coming together to discuss and agree on plans for the future of Europe, “a conference to be attended by Europeans representative of Europe’s political parties and of the vital forces in European society. The idea was to recruit leading European figures capable of giving life to the concept of European unity and the joint exercise of national sovereignties.”⁸

The “Message to Europeans” issued by the Congress included a “pledge” on the desire of the participants for a “United Europe”, including “a Charter of Human Rights guaranteeing liberty of thought, assembly and expression as well as the right to form a political opposition”, a “Court of Justice with adequate sanctions for the implementation of this Charter” and “a European Assembly where the live forces of all our nations shall be represented”. “In our homes and in public, in our political and religious life, in our professional and trade union circles », the pledge said, “our fullest support” will be given “to all persons and governments working for this lofty cause.”⁹

In the Congress “[i]dealists and realists were represented by prominent clergymen and by famous politicians respectively, and sandwiched between these extremes were professors and unionists, philosophers and journalists, poet laureates and professional propagandists.”¹⁰ This description of participants comes close to what can be summarized as ‘civil society’: people coming together to pursue a shared goal beyond their direct economic interest.

Civil society is a broad concept, and it is in many cases used without defining it precisely. ¹¹ Often civil society is partly defined by what it is not, for example in describing civil society as “the arena outside family, government, and market where people voluntarily associate to advance common interests ».¹² The non-governmental organisation (NGO) is the main organisational manifestation of civil society (the more or less synonymous term ‘civil society organisation’, CSO, is also in use). NGOs are very diverse, not just because of the subjects they deal with or their underlying ideology or approach, but also because they range from large membership-based organisations to often small groups of experts. The latter type of NGO has proliferated in the final decades of the 20th century and has started to dominate in numbers and in public perception, a phenomenon referred to as “NGO-isation” of civil society.¹³ Many of these NGOs developed in conjunction with an expansion of funding being made available for social development and justice purposes by a range of governments and private funders.

In the second decade of the 21st century, less formal forms of organisation became more prominent again, stimulated by mostly internet-based ways of organising but also by repression targeting officially registered organisations, and more encompassing descriptions of ‘civil society’ started to be used. For example Civicus, the main international NGO that supports and defends civil society, now calls itself “a membership-based alliance” and says it uses a “broad” definition of civil society, which “covers non-governmental organisations, activists, civil society coalitions and networks, protest and social movements, voluntary bodies, campaigning organisations, charities, faith-based groups, trade unions and philanthropic foundations”¹⁴. A description that seems to fit remarkably well the broad composition of the 1948 Congress of Europe.

It is often, mostly implicitly, assumed that all of civil society shares the same values of justice, freedom, dignity and democracy, and uses peaceful means to bring about any changes. But this is not automatically the case. The 1948 Congress of Europe, because of incompatibility regarding values and approaches, excluded the communists, an important organising force in a number of Western European countries,.¹⁵ In today’s world, Civicus talks about the rise of an “uncivil society”, “socially conservative voices”. “What matters about civil society is not its organisational form or how it works as much as what it stands for. The key test is whether we defend and advance fundamental rights, and are guided by a vision of human equality and social justice.”¹⁶ This vision leads to substantial overlap with the concept of “human rights defender”, a term that has become prominent in the international human rights jargon since the 1990s, with the UN Declaration on Human Rights Defenders of 1998¹⁷ as the leading document.

With the creation in 1949 by ten states of the Council of Europe, the key points of the ‘pledge’ of the Congress of Europe were realized. The new organisation drew up the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), which established the European Court of Human Rights. A Consultative Assembly of parliamentarians from the member states (later renamed Parliamentary Assembly, PACE) became a prominent body of the new organisation.

The work of the Council of Europe has had a direct impact on civil society since the beginning: number of the rights included in the ECHR determine the freedom of civil society actors to operate. Also, the CoE has developed specific soft law standards (‘Recommendations’) on the functioning of NGOs and civil society; monitoring of their implementation by states and reacting to lack of implementation would be in the interest of civil society.

Apart from the situation of civil society itself, the standards set and procedures established by the CoE open entry points for the submission of information and advocacy by civil society on a wide range of subjects. This is also the case for the process of development of new standards. In addition, the PACE is attractive for civil society actors because of its country and thematic monitoring role and the relatively low threshold in accessing PACE members who may support their cause. The work of the CoE’s Commissioner for Human Rights, a position that was created in 1999¹⁸, re-inforces the voice of human rights NGOs. Also, projects in which the CoE cooperates with its member states on reforms to achieve compliance with the Organisation’s standards¹⁹, often use specialist NGO expertise.

In some of these processes, international NGOs that have been given ‘participatory status’ enjoy certain privileges. This status is the successor of the ‘consultative status’ that was created by the Council of Europe already in the early 1950s²⁰. The NGOs with participatory status together form the Conference of International NGOs (CINGO). No similar status is available for national NGOs.

Since the Summit called for “further reinforcement” of “meaningful engagement with civil society”, this paper gives an overview of the current state of engagement, of initiatives in recent years on that engagement, and of proposals that, if implemented, would further strengthen it. It does not pretend to present an exhaustive inventory and analysis of all interfaces of civil society and the Council of Europe. It is based on existing written sources, not on newly collected data.

Much information for the paper is drawn from a number of reports by the CoE’s Directorate of Internal Oversight (DIO), the Organisation’s own audit and evaluation unit, that touch on aspects of the role of civil society or NGOs.²¹ A number of other Council of Europe documents issued over the last years also provide information on policies towards civil society. The Civil Society Portal²² and a Handbook²³ on working with the Council of Europe, both launched in 2022, were intended as a general overview of and a guide for civil society engagement with the Organisation.²⁴ They were produced as part of the follow-up to a Helsinki 2019 Ministerial Decision on strengthening the protection and promotion of civil society space in Europe and improving engagement with civil society and human rights defenders.²⁵ One of the other activities implementing the Helsinki decision was holding the first of what are planned to be annual meetings of the Secretary General with civil society representatives. This meeting took place on 15 September 2023, producing a series of recommendations for further development of relations between civil society and the CoE²⁶. Which use will be made of those recommendations is unclear; they were not picked up in the Secretary General’s Roadmap on the Council of Europe’s Engagement with Civil Society 2024-2027 as that document had been finalized just before the meeting.²⁷ The Roadmap was prepared in response to the already quoted call by the Reykjavik Summit for “a review and further reinforcement” of “meaningful engagement” with civil society. In December 2023, it was approved by the Committee of Ministers, and an “implementation plan” of the Roadmap will be on the CoM’s agenda in 2024.

Around the same time, the Programme and Budget 2024-2027 for the Council of Europe was adopted. Additional resources for work with civil society are mentioned in the sections on the Commissioner for Human Rights and on the Reykjavik Principles for Democracy²⁸. The latter section says the extra resources will allow to “engage with civil society on a wider footing, based on openness, inclusiveness and transparency. It will facilitate access of civil society organisations to the Council of Europe’s work, as well as to ensure a follow-up on any proposals coming from them, where appropriate.” Work in this direction is starting in 2024, and its results should become visible in the coming years.

The following three sections of this paper provide an overview and examples of the three main perspectives on the CoE’s relationship with civil society briefly introduced above. Section 2 discusses the space provided to civil society by the Council of Europe’s action. Section 3 covers civil society’s involvement in the Council of Europe’s activities (standard setting, monitoring, cooperation). Section 4 deals with the formal recognition of NGOs by the Council of Europe. The final section 5 presents overarching concluding remarks, including a short reflection on the possible longer-term role of civil society in upholding the continued relevance of the Council of Europe and its values.

2. The Council of Europe and space for civil society

The provisions on freedom of expression, of association and of assembly in the European Convention on Human Rights directly affect the freedom of civil society actors to operate (as they do for those active in politics and in the media). Truthful application of the Convention and implementation of verdicts of the European Court of Human Rights will allow civil society to operate without interference. In this respect, the explicit re-commitment of the Reykjavik Declaration to the Convention system and the emphasis on efforts to address non-implementation of Court judgments is important.²⁹

Whether this will yield the necessary results can be doubted; experience shows that governments with autocratic inclinations can be quite successful in delaying and in evading implementing Court judgments, in the meantime continuing steps towards autocratization³⁰. Court verdicts are by definition reactive, coming some time after violations have started occurring. The implementation of opinions, advice and recommendations from other CoE bodies or procedures that can have a preventive role, should therefore receive more attention. ³¹ Pro-active other mechanisms are also needed to realize the Summit’s plan to step up “efforts to create an enabling environment for human rights defenders”.

The European Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice Commission) for example has issued a range of opinions on freedom of association³², both country-specific and thematic. Attention for the situation of human rights defenders has been explicitly added to the mandate of the Commissioner for Human Rights.³³ The Commissioner has, inter alia, regularly discussed their situation with human rights defenders from across Europe, leading to reports with recommendations to the member states.³⁴ Also, many other thematic and country reports by the Commissioner are wholly or partially devoted to the situation of human rights defenders.

The Parliamentary Assembly has put in place a rapporteurship on the situation of human rights defenders. Also, for PACE country rapporteurs, civic space and related human rights issues are usually a central area of attention.

The Committee of Ministers has issued several Recommendations (soft law instruments) relevant to civil society: in 2007 on the legal status of non-governmental organisations in Europe,³⁵ in 2017 on civil participation in political decision making³⁶, in 2018 on the need to strengthen the protection and promotion of civil society space³⁷, and in 2022 on (inter alia) protecting youth civil society³⁸. The latter two contain a provision for examination of their implementation after five years. This has not (yet) happened for the 2018 document but it is included in a listing of (possible) examinations in the coming years.³⁹

The situation of NGOs is a logical area of concern for the Conference of INGOs. It has created the Expert Council on NGO Law⁴⁰ which uses the 2007 Recommendation on the legal status on NGOs as its main reference point in reviewing the practices of member states. In 2021 it produced a review of the implementation of the Recommendation⁴¹. This report expresses concern about the limited awareness of the Recommendation, “reinforced by the fact that many Council of Europe member states do not seem to have acted upon the specific recommendations for governments to be guided in their legislation, policies and practice by the minimum standards set out in this recommendation and to take account of these standards in monitoring the commitments they have made (…)”.⁴² The report concludes that the Recommendation merits greater recognition among NGOs themselves but also “by parliaments and public authorities, with the latter two giving effect to its provisions in legislation and decisions that can affect the operation and activities of NGOs.”⁴³ No follow-up has apparently been given to this report and its conclusions by leading organs of the Council of Europe.

One of the working groups of the 15 September 2023 meeting of the Secretary General and civil society representatives dealt with space for civil society. A number of the proposals presented urge to prioritize and give greater publicity to this subject:

– “All CoE entities should prioritise issues relating to the shrinking of civil space (ECtHR to prioritise applications concerning that topic, Committee of Ministers to prioritise implementation of ECtHR judgments on the topic, etc.). The civil society space situation in member states should be monitored to ensure that legislative proposals and implementation of laws are aligned with CoE human rights standards and obligations.”

– “The CoE should speak out, both at national and European level, against legislation which is harmful to civil society space and which threatens to undermine basic democratic standards – the reaction to negative trends should be prompt and stern.”

– “There is a need to introduce a mechanism to alert and raise awareness about the shrinking of civil society space, including that on children’s rights and, similar to the Platform for the Freedom of Journalists⁴⁴, to share the challenges faced by civil society and potential ways to counter them.”⁴⁵

As already remarked above, it is unclear what will happen with these proposals. They could still be taken up and included in the implementation plan of the SG’s Roadmap and, in that way, be included in the Summit implementation measures. The first and second points are of a general nature and require higher priority for civic space matters in agenda setting of the Secretary General and the Committee of Ministers, in response to e.g. reports and alerts by the Commissioner, the Venice Commission or the Expert Council on NGO Law. The third point is more concrete and could fit well in the implementation plan.

3. Civil society and Council of Europe processes (standard setting, monitoring, cooperation)

The Council of Europe’s operations are structured in three dimensions, described by the Organisation as an “unequalled dynamic triangle of “setting international standards, monitoring them and ensuring relevant co-operation activities to address shortcomings””.⁴⁶ Civil society plays a role in each of these three dimensions, and in each of them the CoE has arrangements for the facilitation of this role.⁴⁷ Also, in some fields, civil society has self-organised to strengthen its role in CoE processes.

The documents of the CoE Secretariat as well as the DIO evaluations show that the overriding perspective on the interaction with civil society in each of the dimensions is that of the provision of information and of expertise. From the perspective of the NGOs, this is attractive as a possible way of influencing the work of the organisation and ultimately of influencing the policies of member states. This means using a ‘cooperation/inside track’ for policy influencing, as described by Start and Hovland in 2004. ⁴⁸ The opposite approach to policy influencing is named the ‘confrontation/outside track’ by these authors, including advocacy and pressure tactics. Some NGOs have a predominant tradition that excludes one or the other of these approaches, but many will want to be able to use both, making the precise mixture dependent on what they think is effective in a specific situation. In particular when authorities show a lack of political will on a certain issue, or even exhibit a more general explicit deviation from or disdain of human rights and democracy standards, NGOs may feel that emphasis on confrontational tactics is needed.

This leads to the thesis that both tracks are potentially important in all three main dimensions of the work of the CoE (standard setting, monitoring, cooperation): in making the standards as strong as needed, in getting them ratified quickly, in fully implementing them and in promoting reforms needed for that full implementation. To achieve the maximum benefit from civil society involvement, both the provision of expertise and the capacity for sustained advocacy should be welcomed by the CoE, and stimulated. Paradoxically, but not illogically, this thesis is most clearly supported by the evaluation by DIO of civil society’s role in the most expertise-oriented dimension, the co-operation activities (see more in section 3.3).

The Secretary General’s Roadmap on the Council of Europe’s Engagement with Civil Society, the policy document that was issued after the Reykjavik Summit, while mentioning all three dimensions, does not address the question how the potential of civil society in each of them can be maximized. It mostly argues that best practice in the standard-setting and monitoring dimensions should be identified and distributed (see reference in section 3.2). Thus, further work on civil society engagement remains to be done to fully implement the Reykjavik Summit’s commitment.

The following sections give a short overview of civil society engagement in the three dimensions and of possibilities for improvements, mostly drawing on Council of Europe documents.

3.1 Standard setting

Standard setting is one of the main tasks of the intergovernmental Steering Committees (SCs)⁴⁹, composed of experts from the member states, usually specialized civil servants who travel to Strasbourg for the SC meetings. The 2016 DIO report on the contribution of NGOs to standard setting and monitoring in the CoE finds a clear great appreciation for the expert contributions by NGO representatives in Steering Committees. “NGOs often prove to be “natural allies” of the CoE (the expression was repeatedly used by interviewees), because they usually share fundamental values and general objectives with the CoE. What is at stake in the dialogue between the CoE and NGOs is rarely whether or not certain rights or values should be protected and upheld, but how to best protect and uphold them.” ⁵⁰

The terms of reference of the SCs cover the participation of civil society representatives. The Conference of INGOs has a ‘quality seat’ on each of the SCs; in addition, often a number of other NGOs (usually but not necessarily INGOs, and usually but not necessarily members of the Conference of INGOs) are given ‘observer’ status. This number can vary greatly, and in some cases seems to be kept low on purpose. For example, the Human Rights Steering Committee (CDDH) has since decades had just five human rights INGOs as observers. The 2016 DIO report describes this as an example of “good practice”. “As one interviewee summarized, “the committee is selective when it comes to observers, but once you are a member of the family you are trusted by all and your voice really counts.”⁵¹

The Committee on Artificial Intelligence (CAI) is probably a quantitative record holder, with the CINGO delegate and 31 other civil society organizations mentioned in the Terms of Reference⁵². A substantial portion of these took part in deliberations in 2023/2024 on the creation of a Framework Convention on Artificial Intelligence, Human Rights, the Rule of Law and Democracy.⁵³ They were shut out from the actual drafting, but could comment on text proposals in the plenary CAI meeting. The exclusion from the drafting caused some dismay among the NGOs, and the question might be asked whether at least the one CINGO-appointed participant could not have been included.

At the 15 September 2023 meeting of the Secretary General and civil society representatives, the non-uniform approach of Council of Europe bodies to participation by civil society was raised: “CSOs noted that the CoE should pay more attention in ensuring the consistency of civil society’s involvement in the different standard-setting work of the Organisation, as often access depends on each standard-setting body, and at times even on the personal engagement by the Chair/Secretariat staff.” It was, inter alia, suggested that “[c]ommon rules and guidelines for CSOs’ participation should be developed”. Also, “engagement should be inclusive of all groups, especially minorities, including those without many resources/lack of presence in Strasbourg; CoE should consider funding those who cannot afford to participate in key meetings.”⁵⁴

The 2016 DIO evaluation had already proposed a number of steps to address this issue, including looking at “modalities for selecting NGO observers, and development of common basic criteria and procedures for the future selection of NGOs”, “publication on the steering committees’ websites of the procedure and criteria for selection of observer NGOs” and the “organisation of ad hoc hearings and consultations with non-observer NGOs during drafting processes”⁵⁵, but these apparently have not been fully implemented yet. For example, the possibility to request input on draft standards from a wide group of NGOs by means of public consultations has in recent years been used only once, namely on the draft text of the Recommendation on Countering Strategic Lawsuits against Public Participation (SLAPPs).⁵⁶ .

A further finding of the 2016 DIO evaluation is that NGOs are “key advocates for CoE standards”.⁵⁷ The way it is formulated, this finding pertains to standards after they have been agreed. The period during which standards are being developed however also lends itself for advocacy activities, for example to make them stronger and more comprehensive, or to include a strong monitoring mechanism.

For example, at several times during the drafting process, civil society participants in the CAI issued public appeals on the content and process of drafting the Framework Convention on Artificial Intelligence, Human Rights, the Rule of Law and Democracy⁵⁸. In the latest of these, in January 2024, just before the end of the negotiations, a hundred civil society organisations, both NGOs involved in the CAI process and national NGOs from a range of countries, co-signed the appeal. Whether and to what extent these appeals influenced the negotiation position of any of the member states, and ultimately the outcome of the negotiations, would be interesting to study. Apart from this, it can be argued the awareness-raising effect of such appeals among civil society organisations has a value in itself, and can possibly positively influence future willingness to advocate for ratification and adequate implementation of the new standards.

This mode of action is likely to be used by civil society organisations on issues they think are of great importance. Standards on the right to a healthy environment form another example. In 2024, while still in the phase of a ‘feasibility study’⁵⁹ that might or might not lead to the start of negotiations on a new standard, publicity actions and appeals were already being organized by civil society groups.⁶⁰ 

3.2 Monitoring (implementation of standards)

A number of monitoring mechanisms have been developed in the Council of Europe system to measure whether and how Council of Europe standards are being met.⁶¹ The most prominent of these are probably the monitoring by the Parliamentary Assembly of the “Honouring of Obligations and Commitments by Member States”, and the supervision by the Committee of Ministers of the execution of judgments of the European Court of Human Rights⁶².

The Monitoring Committee of the Parliamentary Assembly runs an extensive programme.⁶³ The intensity of the monitoring depends on the level of concern about the state of human rights, rule of law and democracy in each country. Contacts with civil society organisations are a standard element of the monitoring process. For civil society organisations who want to reach out themselves, it is usually easy to find PACE members who are willing to receive their information and take into account their views. The annual decision-making by the PACE on the credentials of each of the country delegations is one of the moments when the Assembly can have real impact on the relations of the Council of Europe with its member states; the refusal of the credentials of the Azerbaijani delegation in January 2024 was an extraordinary reminder of this.⁶⁴ In particular for NGOs who have chosen, or have been forced into, a ‘confrontational’ mode of operation, this can be a relatively easy way of exerting influence.

For several decades already, the proper execution of judgments of the European Court of Human Rights has been recognized by member states as an issue of concern, again underlined in the Reykjavik Declaration⁶⁵. Since 2006, NGOs can submit information on the progress of implementation, under Rule 9.2 of the Rules for supervision.⁶⁶ With some delay, this possibility has started to be used on a large scale by NGOs from around Europe. The European Implementation Network, a cooperation arrangement of (by now) around thirty mostly national NGOs and a number of legal experts founded in 2016, has played a major role in stimulating Rule 9.2 submissions.⁶⁷ In many cases, these submissions are providing essential additional information for the evaluation of the process of judgment implementation.

For many NGOs, these submissions have become a logical extension of their involvement in putting forward complaints to the Court, either by lawyers who are NGO staff members, or by lawyers with whom they are cooperating. The Court has recognized the importance of NGOs for its work, inter alia by annually holding meetings with NGOs.⁶⁸

The EIN has also fostered attention for the importance of advocacy at the national level, stimulating national NGO strategizing on the implementation of (particular categories of) judgments.⁶⁹ This is an example of how civil society’s work at the national level can contribute to CoE goals. The extent to which NGOs actually engage in sustained national advocacy is likely to depend on the availability of resources. It may be a lengthy process in adverse conditions, much different from the welcome that good quality NGO information on judgment implementation gets from the CoE’s Department on the Execution of Judgments.

A series of other mechanisms have been created to monitor specific Council of Europe standards.⁷⁰ A number of conventions are being monitored by committees set up under those conventions. Some of these committees were covered in the 2016 DIO evaluation that looked at NGOs, standard setting and monitoring. As mentioned already in section 3.1, this evaluation states that “NGOs are key advocates for CoE standards.” While international NGOs play a greater role in the drafting of standards and their dissemination once agreed, “national NGOs are mostly involved in the practical implementation of CoE treaties, which is of high relevance to monitoring bodies.” In interviews during country visits carried out for the evaluation, “many NGO representatives emphasize the link between their advocacy at national and local levels, and the work of the monitoring bodies. Whether or not they contribute directly to the monitoring process itself, they channel the monitoring reports and their recommendations at all levels. Monitoring body members perceive this added value, as they are 81.6% to consider that it is fully or partly accurate to say that NGOs lobby the member States to implement CoE conventions. Some NGOs regard CoE monitoring reports as their main advocacy tools, along with reports by other international organisations (especially the UN Human Rights Council and, in EU candidate countries, the European Commission reports).” ⁷¹

Each monitoring mechanism has its own type of interaction with civil society actors. These are partly determined by the mandate of each mechanism and the processes that define its operations. For example, since civil society is itself mentioned in the Istanbul Convention (art. 9), its situation is of direct concern to the Group of Experts on Action against Violence against Women and Domestic Violence (GREVIO), the convention’s monitoring body. A separate section is devoted to civil society in all of GREVIO’s reports. While the latest annual report has an upbeat tone about the role and situation of civil society⁷², the country reports, which on virtually all countries have benefitted from input by the authorities as well as from civil society, are much more critical about governmental policies towards civil society.⁷³ It would be interesting to study whether any follow-up advocacy by civil society actors took place, and whether any policy changes occurred based on GREVIO observations and recommendations.

The European Social Charter’s monitoring body, the European Committee of Social Rights, deals both with national reports on the implementation of the Charter’s provisions and with collective complaints about states’ non-compliance.⁷⁴ Civil society actors can comment on the national reports before the Committee comes to conclusions. In the collective complaints procedure, social partners and specifically designated INGOs with participatory status are entitled to take part. Only one treaty party (Finland) has opened the possibility for any national NGO to submit complaints. ⁷⁵ There are many opt-in and opt-out possibilities for different elements and versions of the treaty, leading to a complicated and fractured reporting landscape. It appears that civil society under-utilizes the possibilities of the Charter to provide input, either in the form of collective complaints or of comments on national reports. Lack of knowledge, the complexity of the system, or the expectation that a conclusion or decision by the Committee will have little impact all may be contributing factors to this under-utilization.

While each monitoring mechanism has its built-in particularities, habits that have developed throughout the years also are a factor in the way each mechanism operates. The 2016 DIO evaluation therefore recommends more exchange of good practices among monitoring committees.⁷⁶ A 2022 evaluation of monitoring mechanisms, though not specifically directed at the role of NGOs, almost literally makes the same point⁷⁷. Implementation of this recommendation seems to have been limited, as it was again brought up in the Secretary General’s Roadmap on the Council of Europe’s Engagement with Civil Society, issued after the Reykjavik Summit.

In recent years, the monitoring mechanisms have been the subject of extensive review by the CoE’s senior leadership.⁷⁸ One of the areas identified as in need for improvement, is the relative lack of visibility and media attention.⁷⁹ Civil society is not referred to at all, though it can be one of the actors that assist in increasing visibility (as made clear in the 2016 DIO evaluation). Civil society will usually focus on elements in reporting that are critical of government policies, and precisely those elements are likely to draw media attention.

Civil society is often an essential source of information for monitoring mechanisms, as well as potential advocacy actors for the implementation of their recommendations. The existence of an enabling environment for civil society actors should therefore be an issue of attention for all mechanisms. As said above, in the case of the Istanbul Convention this consideration is included in the Convention itself, but in other cases the monitoring bodies could also consider steps to recognize and strengthen the role of civil society actors relevant for the mechanism, up to coming to their defence against attacks.

Soft law standards agreed by the Committee of Ministers (Recommendations or Guidelines) that do not have a dedicated monitoring mechanism can still be of great interest to civil society actors, for example because they cover subjects that are relatively underdeveloped in formal law. Reviewing their follow-up can be (but not always is) assigned to Steering Committees. An example is the review of the 2010 Recommendation on Combating Discrimination on Grounds of Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity by the Steering Committee on Anti-discrimination, Diversity, and Inclusion. In 2023, ILGA Europe started a process of gathering civil society information for a new review.⁸⁰ This is the third time the implementation of this Recommendation will be reviewed at Steering Committee’s level. This is an exceptional case, as the lead NGO, ILGA Europe, could attract funding (from one of the Council of Europe’s member states) for national NGOs that contribute to the information gathering. The report released by the Expert Council on NGO Law of the Conference of INGOs on the 2007 Recommendation on the legal status on NGOs, already mentioned in section 2, is yet another example.

In these cases, questions remain about the impact of the reporting on the member states’ policies and practices. Are conclusions and recommendations discussed and endorsed by the Committee of Ministers? Are they placed on the agenda of national policy-making bodies?

3.3 Cooperation

The DIO Evaluation of Civil Society Participation in Co-operation Programmes (2023)⁸¹ looked at the role of NGOs in “technical co-operation programmes”, the third dimension in the Council of Europe’s “dynamic triangle” The programmes are set up “to assist the beneficiaries in their efforts to apply the standards”.⁸² The “beneficiaries” referred to are states that fail to meet the standards.

The overarching message of the 2023 DIO evaluation is that “[t]he Council of Europe’s approach to civil society participation in co-operation activities is suitable to achieve specific project objectives. However, this approach is not very clear in relation to the Organisation’s overall aims for civil society participation. From this point of view, civil society participation in co-operation activities is only partial and misses the broader aims of enabling civil society to contribute to the fulfilment of, lobbying and advocating for, and monitoring of the fulfilment of standards and conventions”.⁸³

The evaluation is full of material sustaining this conclusion. “CSO representatives more commonly stated their desire that the Council of Europe assist more in the advocacy [part] of their work. For example, a CSO representative in Serbia said: “The Council of Europe cannot do it, but I will say it anyway. Help us to maintain the watchdog role, to be more politically engaged at the political level. It is not the same as when you trained some people although that is very important.”⁸⁴

A case study on the Czech Republic, Portugal and Slovenia that was part of the evaluation “revealed cases where civil society involvement was seen as negative by the national authorities. The CSOs were able to perform the role expected of civil society, but the success they achieve also depends on the willingness of authorities to engage. A CSO representative in Slovenia commented that: ’Civil society is the hardest thing to get national government support for. It holds a mirror up to government, showing where it is failing. This depends on the government’s maturity to receive this message. (…).’”⁸⁵

The evaluation found that “[c]ivil society participation in co-operation activities is most hampered by confrontational political contexts, as CSO presence is interrogated and advocacy and scrutiny resisted.” “The influence of the political, socio-economic climate in each country affects the nature of CSOs. Where […] independent funding and resources are available, civil society is more autonomous and able to concentrate on its mission and vision. Where the climate is more precarious, the instability presents challenges for CSOs to behave and operate in accordance with their missions. Data showed that the quality of civil society participation in Council of Europe projects did not depend so much on the socio-economic climate. It did, however, depend very much on the political situation.”⁸⁶

The mere provision of expertise for “technical cooperation” is insufficient to achieve the overall, long-term objectives of the cooperation programs. Forms of monitoring and advocacy are normally also required, and the evaluation concludes that the Council of Europe’s work with civil society should facilitate this, protect them from possible backlash by authorities and aim for creating sustainable independent feedback loops on government policies and practices. It seems that the “Management Response” to the 2023 DIO evaluation has not fully taken this conclusion on board as it rejects a recommendation to include more general support for civil society (rather than only focusing on project-linked expertise provision) in cooperation programmes.⁸⁷ The main funder by far of the cooperation programmes, the European Union, could possibly also require that this consideration is given more attention. There may be limits to the acceptance by the “beneficiary” authorities of the strengthening of civil society watchdog and advocacy activities but these limits should not be implicitly accepted by the CoE but rather be stretched and tested as much as possible.

4. The Council of Europe’s formal recognition of NGOs

The “participatory status” for international NGOs was introduced in 2003 as the successor to the consultative status that dated back to 1952. The latest version (2016) of the decision on the status⁸⁸ states that “the system of co-operation introduced by consultative status in 1952 and, since 2003, by participatory status, largely permitted the development and strengthening of co-operation between the Council of Europe and the voluntary sector, giving positive and particularly encouraging results for both parties,” and that the purpose of the status is “to facilitate INGO participation and access to such bodies as the intergovernmental committees and other subsidiary bodies of the Committee of Ministers and the monitoring bodies of the Council of Europe’s treaties in accordance with the texts in force. This participation will allow the INGOs to continue to draw the Council of Europe’s attention to the effects of changes in European societies and the problems facing them.” The participatory status can only be given to organisations that “defend the values and principles of the Council of Europe” and “support the achievement of that closer unity mentioned in Article 1 of the Council of Europe’s Statute”.

Under the current rules, the participatory status is only available to international NGOs, defined as having members in at least five Council of Europe member states. Most NGOs that engage closely with the CoE (or potentially could start engaging closely) cannot obtain this status because they operate in only one country. Many of them probably are indirectly represented through international umbrella bodies to which they belong and which qualify for participatory status. Information flows up and down these bodies, however, often do not prioritise Council of Europe related issues. This means that any engagement of these national NGOs with the CoE goes through direct cooperation channels (see section 3.3) and direct contacts with monitoring mechanisms (see section 3.2).

A decision to create a formal “partnership status” for national NGOs ⁸⁹, taken in 2003 alongside the one on participatory status, has fallen into disuse very quickly. This may have been caused by the expected burden of administering this status, combined with the potential (greater than for international NGOs) for dissatisfaction among member states over the recognition of NGOs they consider too critical, and for pressure from those same states to accept NGOs that like state policies. The DIO, in its 2023 evaluation on civil society and cooperation activities, had difficulty in compiling a list of (national) NGOs that had some kind of relationship with the Council of Europe or worked on themes covered by the CoE.⁹⁰ One of its recommendations was to inform civil society organisations “on a regular basis on how they can be involved in Council of Europe work beyond projects (…) through concrete means such as newsletters, group e-mails, communiqués, etc.”⁹¹

The number of international NGOs with participatory status seems to lie between 300 and 400, and has been slowly decreasing.⁹² The thematic orientation of these INGOs is very diverse; a 2012 breakdown gives the highest scores for “education and culture” (49%), “human rights” (46%), “international cooperation” (44%), and “social cohesion” (41%). Not all these orientations provide an extensive interface with areas that are central in the Council of Europe mandate. Still, on the basis of their “human rights” orientation, almost half of these INGOs should be able to contribute to this clear priority field, if not directly in Strasbourg then at least by informing and stimulating activity of their own member organisations. The latter activity could probably be facilitated by centrally produced materials, such as the newsletter proposed in DIO’s 2023 evaluation, referred to above.

The participatory status automatically grants the membership to the Conference of International NGOs (CINGO). The 2016 Committee of Ministers decision on the participatory status mentions the “important role of the Conference of INGOs as the representative body of all of the INGOs enjoying participatory status with the Council of Europe”, and refers to the INGOs as one element of a so-called “Quadrilogue” with the Committee of Ministers, the Parliamentary Assembly, and the Congress of Local and Regional Authorities. The CINGO president has increasingly been invited as a speaker to sessions of the Committee of Ministers, to the annual Ministerial Meetings, as well as to the rare CoE Summits (Warsaw, 2005, Reykjavik, 2023)⁹³. Also, the standard seat of a CINGO representative on the Steering Committees, and the cooperation in some cases with PACE and the Congress of Local and Regional Authorities can be considered as aspects of the “Quadrilogue”. However, a full description of the role and functioning of this “Quadrilogue” is not available, and recent CM decisions (Helsinki 2019) and the Reykjavik Summit have not referred to it.

A 2021 evaluation by the Directorate of Internal Oversight gives a mixed picture of the usefulness and effectiveness of the CINGO.⁹⁴ Measured in relation to the historical record and against the benchmarks included in the budget and programme of the section of the Secretariat that services the CINGO, the performance was not bad. A number of instances can be found where CINGO output has contributed to the goals of the Council of Europe, e.g. through the work of the Expert Council on NGO Law (which, however, deserves better follow-up, as argued in section 2 of this paper).

At the same time, the evaluation found that “[t]he relevance of the Conference to the Council of Europe is difficult to establish with certainty based on the available sources”.⁹⁵ A number of prominent international NGOs with participatory status do engage with Council of Europe processes, but not through their CINGO membership.⁹⁶ The civil society contributions to the monitoring processes and the influencing of national policies and practices, described in sections 3.2 and 3.3 above, are key to the effectiveness of the CoE, but (since they mostly involve national NGOs) take place outside of CINGO. Most monitoring mechanisms also produce reports with a thematic focus which lack civil society attention and advocacy for the implementation of their recommendations. An overarching civil society body could in principle play a role here, but CINGO’s mode of organisation seems to not take this into consideration. One step further would be to undertake efforts to organize civil society shadow reporting on priority subjects, similarly to ILGA Europe’s initiative on the Recommendation on Combating Discrimination on Grounds of Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity, described in section 3.2. Using the ILGA initiative as an example, obtaining funding for such a process would have to be part of those efforts.

The evaluation did not ask whether more resources could lead to a more effective Conference. Until 2012 funding for CINGO was substantially higher⁹⁷. Cuts in that year led to a reduction in the frequency of CINGO General Assemblies from four to two per year. Restoring the old frequency might not be a high priority, but doing more to, for example, systematically inform and engage national NGOs, request contributions to standard-setting processes and to monitoring of agreed standards, and stimulate advocacy for the follow-up of monitoring outcomes should increase the impact of the Council of Europe as a whole.

Finally, the cooperation with democratic forces and civil society from Belarus and Russia has become a completely separate field of policy development. While the Reykjavik Declaration deals with the two countries in one paragraph⁹⁸, the differences in the relationship between them are great. The Russian state has been ejected from the Council of Europe, and the possibilities for contacts and cooperation with alternative Russian actors are still being discussed.⁹⁹ In the meantime, the involvement of human rights defenders from Russia continues in the submission of complaints to the European Court of Human Rights (possible for violations committed before 16 September 2022) as well as in the provision of information for the supervision of the execution of judgments.¹⁰⁰ Russia also continues (at the time of writing this paper, April 2024) to be a party to around forty Council of Europe conventions¹⁰¹, some of which lend themselves to information provision by NGOs as well, for example the Convention on the Prevention of Torture. If the Russian occupation of parts of Ukraine continues, a role for Russian lawyers and NGOs (possibly in cooperation with Ukrainian colleagues, who cannot enter the occupied territories) in supporting victims of human rights violations in these territories may be appropriate, and should maybe even be stimulated – a politically very sensitive issue.

Apart from the engagement that derives from Russia’s past membership of the Council of Europe, a future-oriented perspective should also be explored for activities, aiming for the ultimate return of the country to the Council of Europe. Some Russian civil society actors have explicitly included this aspiration in their manifestos.¹⁰² Possibly with a future-oriented mind-set as well, the Parliamentary Assembly has created a “contact platform” for dialogue with representatives of Russian democratic opposition forces.¹⁰³

With respect to Belarus, since it never joined the Council of Europe, the focus has always been on a future-oriented approach. The process of rapprochement with the Belarusian government (including by the ratification by Belarus of a number of “open” conventions) broke down, after the harsh repression of the protests against election fraud in 2020, and relations were quickly built up with the democratic opposition, which had a credible claim of having won the elections.¹⁰⁴ The Committee of Ministers agreed on the creation of the Contact Group with the democratic opposition and civil society. Although the immediate impact of the Council of Europe’s engagement on the situation on the ground will be very limited, civil society information-collection skills and outputs are also relevant to UN mechanisms, which remain applicable to Belarus. The provision of information on CoE values and standards, tailored to a wider audience in the country, should in the long term contribute to public support for human rights and for European multilateral human rights cooperation.¹⁰⁵

5. Concluding remarks

The engagement of the Council of Europe with civil society has been addressed in a number of papers and initiatives over the last ten to twenty years. These have a rather incomplete implementation record.¹⁰⁶ The formal implementation document of the Reykjavik Summit in this policy field, the Secretary General’s Roadmap on the Council of Europe’s Engagement with Civil Society, again does not take fully on board earlier analysis and suggestions. The intention expressed with regard to civil society in the Programme and Budget 2024-2027, which gives an overarching view of plans for the implementation of Summit outcomes, to “engage with civil society on a wider footing, based on openness, inclusiveness and transparency” still allows for a broader and more ambitious approach. Civil society should be much more involved in the implementation of these proposals, ideally in a (co-)leading role. Further improving engagement with civil society can lead to significant gains in the impact of the Council of Europe, but requires better outreach to, recognition of and a broader support toolbox for national civil society actors. This will lead not only to better implementation of specific standards, but also to greater appreciation of the Council of Europe and broader attention and support for the Organisation in general.

At the same time, European civil society that cares about the effectiveness of the Council of Europe should consider a higher prioritisation of work related to the Organisation. This is needed to realise an enhanced role for civil society in monitoring, in advocating the implementation of standards and in drawing the attention of the Committee of Ministers to extreme and/or systematic failures in implementation. There is strong competition from other European centres of intergovernmental organisations, where key NGO staff is often based (Geneva, Brussels), relegating Strasbourg to a secondary place.¹⁰⁷ Measures such as good information provision from Strasbourg (through e.g. a weekly or bi-weekly newsletter), written from a civil society engagement perspective, can partly compensate for this, but would still need to be reinforced by prioritisation by civil society itself of some degree of follow-up to this information.

Recent decades have witnessed a growing public and political disregard for human rights and an increasing disdain for multilateral cooperation. These trends may, in the long term, undermine public support for the Council of Europe and lead politicians to take it less seriously, and to start hollowing out its mechanisms. These are long-term trends that require a fundamental discussion within the human rights movement about their causes and how they can be tackled, including through possibly completely new approaches. A full discussion of this issue goes beyond the scope of this paper. However, a first step in this situation should be to prioritise the use of already existing Council of Europe standards on civic education and human rights education in both formal and informal settings.¹⁰⁸ Shadow reporting on the implementation of established standards should be considered. A further step could be to pay increased attention to the human rights responsibilities of organs of society that are closer to the people than the state, in order to make human rights more tangible. The Council of Europe has for example already done extensive work on the creation of civic, democratic and human rights standards for local authorities¹⁰⁹. These offer a lot of entry points for civil society attention and advocacy.

When the Congress of Europe met in 1948, it had to devise a system to meet the needs of that period. Independent and innovative thinking on the protection and promotion of human rights is needed again today.